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THE DIRTY THIRTIES 
A STUDY IN AGRICULTURAL CAPITALISM 
DONALD WORSTER 
"T he history of any land begins with nature, 
and all histories must end with nature," J. 
Frank Dobie once wrote.' He was eloquently 
right, but until very recently such a view was 
not regarded seriously by academic historians, 
who commonly took nature for granted, 
beginning and ending their studies with an air 
of human omnipotence. That attitude, howev-
er, is becoming harder to maintain in inno-
cence, as a group of ecologically informed 
historians challenge it. It is now more accept-
able to say, with Dobie, that nature has played 
a stage-center role in the making of history-
the making of its setbacks and tragedies as well 
as its progress and triumphs. Whether defined 
as climate, as vegetation, as the presence or 
absence of water, as soil and topography, or 
more compositely as ecosystem and biosphere, 
nature has been a force to be reckoned with in 
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social evolution. Many geographers and an-
thropologists have long acknowledged that 
fact. And now historical thinking, if it wants 
to be taken seriously, must to some extent also 
become ecological.' 
There have been some important excep-
tions to the historians' neglect of environmen-
tal perspectives. Strikingly, those exceptions 
have come mainly out of the Great Plains. 
Dobie was a well-known son of this region, 
growing up and teaching here. So was his 
University of Texas associate, Walter Prescott 
Webb, who stitched history and environment 
together in his writings.' And so was the man 
who, more than any other, anticipated the 
emerging ecological synthesis in history: James 
Malin of the University of Kansas. As far back 
as 1950 Malin was envisioning history as a 
process of "ecological adaptation" and was 
promoting the grasslands as an ideal laborato-
ry for tracking that process.' These scholars, 
particularly Webb and Malin, were not always 
clear about what they meant by adaptation--
whether it was a process of yielding to natural 
exigencies or of surmounting them by means of 
technology-but they were all convinced of 
the profound importance of the human dia-
logue with nature. 
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The Great Plains have uniquely had an 
impact on the historical imagination because 
conditions of settlement there have presented 
so stark a contrast with those in more humid 
American environments. But in the case of 
Malin there was another, more specific influ-
ence at work, riveting his attention on the 
earth. During the 1930s he found himself 
directly in the midst of the Dust Bowl, as 
dramatic an example of maladaption as any in 
human ecological experience. Anyone who 
lived through the "dirty thirties" or the 
subsequent echoes of it, as he did, could hardly 
fail to be impressed by the relevance of 
environmental health to human welfare and 
happiness. The Dust Bowl made emphatically 
clear the consequences nature can have for 
people, the surprises she can bring to those 
who leave her out of their calculations. 
In the traumatic years of the Dust Bowl, 
the Great Plains offered at once a stimulus to 
the rise of an ecologically oriented history and 
a compelling subject for historians to grapple 
with. My main purpose here is to move toward 
a cultural explanation for this disaster, one 
that will, when complete, be adequate to its 
significance and alert to its complexity. Such 
an explanation cannot be the work of any 
single individual, for it demands what no 
individual alone can achieve: first, a detailed, 
interdisciplinary investigation of the special 
environmental conditions of the Plains-their 
cycles of weather and climate, of drought and 
rainfall, their grassland ecosystems as a force 
for moderating and buffering those cycles-
and, second, a probing interpretation of the 
cultural elements introduced here. Of course, 
the rubric of culture in that account will 
encompass the tools, the agricultural tech-
niques, devised to make a living from nature, 
but more basically it must be seen to refer to 
the values, world views, classes, and institu-
tions active on the Plains. Those social and 
mental structures have created the tools and 
determined how they have been used. Finally, 
it is in the swirling interaction of all these 
agencies that an adequate explanation of the 
Dust Bowl is to be found. Ecological history is 
not monocausal. It assigns neither to nature 
nor to culture a sole, exclusive authority over 
the past, its rhythms and events. j 
James Malin, an early advocate of the field 
of ecological history, attempted an explanation 
of the Dust Bowl experience. Or rather, he 
suggested a couple of explanations, both of 
them fragmentary and not entirely compatible 
with each other. Part of their weakness as 
history comes from Malin's bias and provin-
ciality, which prevented him from taking a 
detached view of the culture he was seeking to 
understand. Their value, on the other hand, is 
that they make any simplistic alternative 
impossible to sustain. Though I will argue that 
his explanations do not satisfy the tests of 
evidence or logic, whether taken singly or in 
tandem, they still have their supporters and so 
require some attention. 
In the first place, Malin argued that the 
Dust Bowl was essentially the work of nature, 
being caused by conditions of severe drought; 
that therefore it was an inevitable disaster and 
the plains people its victims, not its perpetra-
tors. In 1946 he published in the Kansas 
Historical Quarterly a series of three articles 
arguing that dust storms "are a part of the 
economy of nature and are not in themselves 
necessarily abnormal."o Painstakingly, he tried 
to show that, long before there was white 
settlement and plowing of the native sod, dust 
storms had blown across the region. Some of 
the dust storms in his examples may in fact 
have been due to drought and others to prairie 
fires, both events being capable of destroying 
natural vegetation and freeing the soil to 
move. Severe, prolonged drought can ruthless-
ly destroy the grassland ecosystem; it certainly 
did so in the distant past, might have done so 
to some degree in the thirties, and undoubted-
ly will do so again in the future. Unfortu-
nately, however, Malin could not, from his 
travelers' reports and newspaper notes, estab-
lish conclusively that drought had been the 
sole and sufficient cause of the pre-Dust Bowl 
storms. Nor could he demonstrate that any of 
the earlier storms matched those of the 1930s 
in intensity or scope, though he did make it 
incontestable, if anyone doubted the point, 
that not every puff of dust had a human origin. 
In arguing that case, he must grant the critical 
point that dust storms are evidence of ecologi-
cal disturbance and disequilibrium, whatever 
the cause. The difficulty he faced was how to 
assign all, or even most, of that disturbance to 
natural factors-and he could not, as an 
historian working \yith archival evidence, 
surmount it. 
Scientists, climatologists and ecologists in 
particular, may one day be able to tell the 
historian why droughts happen. They may 
eventually be prepared to trace their contribu-
tion to wind erosion acre by acre, square mile 
by square mile, county by county. But neither 
in the thirties nor in the decade or two after 
was science able to give a clear, reliable answer 
as to whether humans or nature was responsi-
ble for the Dust Bowl. More recently, howev-
er, photographs taken from orbiting earth 
satellites have begun to supply the kind of data 
that Malin lacked-and it has not been strong 
for his case against nature. In the late winter of 
1977, when the Plains were roiled again by 
high winds and dirt, when Oklahoma was 
stunned by its worst dust storm in twenty 
years, the meteorologist Edward Kessler dem-
onstrated precisely, with the aid of the new 
high-level cameras, that the source of the dust 
was west Texas farms, plowed and planted to 
seed, while neighboring New Mexico lands left 
in grass remained stable.; The dust could 
actually be seen picking up from one side of a 
fence, the plowed side, and streaming 
eastward. Aerial cameras have documented 
that it was not the ragged, pervasive specter of 
drought but the human mind and its ill-
considered land practices-a mind marking its 
presence by straight fence lines-that was the 
main culprit in the 1970s; and the cameras 
show persuasively that the same was probably 
true in the 1930s. There can hardly be any 
doubt now that the destruction by plow of the 
grass cover on vulnerable lands-semiarid 
lands where the soil is loose and the horizon 
flat and open to winds-has been the leading 
reason for the devastating scale of dust storms 
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in the twentieth century. 
Malin seems to have realized, even as he 
was writing, the inadequacy of blaming nature 
for the Dust Bowl. There was clearly some-
thing more at work-in the culture of plains 
people and the nation. Here is what he wrote 
at the end of his dust storm series: 
The worst manifestations of soil blowing 
as related to agricultural operations 
occurred during the pioneering process. 
The country was new, the population 
was not settled-in on a firm and stabil-
ized foundation in harmony with the 
new environment .... The older and 
better established communities usually 
kept their soil fairly well under control. 
In recent times, because of the techno-
logical revolution in agriculture and as 
the result of the initial exploitive stage of 
power farming, the period of the late 
1920's was analogous in a sense to 
pioneering. In the light of that experi-
ence and well considered conservation 
measures, the worst features of those eras 
need not be repeated. There is no reason 
to assume that dust storms can be 
prevented altogether, because without 
question they were frequent and severe 
prior to white settlement and the plow-
ing of the sod, but the damage incident 
to agricultural operations should and 
can be minimized by careful soil manage-
ment.' 
This conclusion took most of the wind, and 
much of the dust, out of his earlier argument. 
It was an almost backhanded way of admitting 
that there had been, after all, significant 
cultural forces at work creating the Dust Bowl 
disaster. 
Malin's second thesis, when closely exam-
ined, had problems of its own. It began with 
the claim that ecological disequilibrium on the 
Plains and the dust storms it generated was 
due, not merely to nature, but to the culture of 
a "pioneer" people. The settlement of the 
region was going through a youthful phase 
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when the land was still unfamiliar to its new 
inhabitants. As newcomers, they did not 
understand what their environmental limits 
were nor have the techniques to overcome 
them. Added to their lack of knowledge was 
an instability in their social organization; 
things generally, the soil included, were out of 
their control. That primitive phase would give 
way, Malin was sure, to one of "better 
established communities," when the popula-
tion would stay put, when farm turnover 
would come to an end, when generation would 
begin to follow generation on the same piece of 
land. Then erosion (except for what was 
natural and inescapable) would come to an 
end. In later writings, Malin would do path-
breaking work on the phenomenon of frontier 
instability; in 1946 he associated such instabili-
ty with the land destruction of the thirties. But 
there was some uncertainty in his reasoning; 
he was not at all sure what he meant by 
"pioneering." Modern power farming in the 
form of the tractor and the mechanized 
harvester had appeared on the Plains, he 
pointed out, immediately before the major 
dust storms-a state of affairs hardly found on 
the archetypal American frontier or in classic 
pioneer life. He described the plainsmen as 
going through an early "exploitive stage" with 
that technology; their culture in the late 1920s 
was only "analogous in a sense to pioneering.''' 
With this sentence Malin shifted the terms of 
his indictment. Advanced technology now 
became the culprit, undermining at least 
temporarily the good judgment embedded in a 
traditional agronomy. But the tractor was not 
forever to be a bad influence, for once the 
revolution was assimilated a new plateau of 
civilization would be reached. Thus no matter 
what he meant by pioneering, whether he had 
in mind the entering of a new land or the 
adoption of a new technology, Malin remained 
optimistic. The Dust Bowl episode was a brief 
spot of darkness and chaos on the road to 
order, and nothing like it would happen again. 
In the passage quoted above, conservation 
appears as a normal activity of a culturally 
mature region. It is defined not as the preserva-
tion of grassland ecosystems but as a regime of 
"careful management" of the soil, and it will 
arrive, Malin asserts, with time, with affluence, 
with more (not less) technology, with popula-
tion equilibrium. The confidence behind these 
assurances resembles closely that of the so-
called Progressive conservationists, as de-
scribed by Samuel Hays.I" Like Malin, they 
maintained that environmental destruction 
was a result of a pioneering culture-of poor, 
ignorant, unsettled people-and that it would 
disappear with progress. But unlike the Pro-
gressive conservationists, for whom the state 
was the proper agency to assume active 
command and move the society beyond its 
pioneering crudities, Malin denied that gov-
ernment was needed to enforce conservation. 
Careful management would come about inevi-
tably with further development of the private 
economy. 
Was Malin right in this confidence? Was 
the Dust Bowl merely a passing stage in the 
plains region's cultural maturing? And is 
environmental adaptation a product of prog-
ress and prosperity? The answer to all those 
questions must be a qualified no. The dirty 
thirties were largely the outcome of a well-
established, long-maturing economic culture, 
that of agricultural capitalism. Moreover, its 
recent apotheosis as agribusiness has not made 
it a more adaptive or stable culture, nor more 
preservation-minded. To be sure, in the af-
termath of the thirties it has been placed under 
some restraint by other, countervailing forces 
in American culture; nonetheless, agricultural 
capitalism remains the dominant agency on 
the plains today, and the prospect is less 
reassuring than Malin wanted us to believe. 
Any attempt to understand the cultural 
roots of the Dust Bowl must begin with a 
scrutiny of Great Plains rural society in the late 
1910s and the 1920s. Before that time there 
were, of course, forays by farmers into the 
fragile shortgrass country, the lands lying 
beyond the hundredth meridian; there was 
precedent for both agricultural settlement and 
widespread ecological disruption. And there 
was a recurrent pattern of crop disaster and 
farm failure, of retreating to ground represent-
ing less risk. But in the teens and twenties 
there occurred the critical assault on the 
grasslands that some have called "the Great 
Plow-up."" A brief summary of the history of 
those years will tell us much about how and 
why there was a Dust Bowl. 
World War I put the American wheat 
farmer into a happy dither. As the Turks cut 
off shipments of grain from Russia, the largest 
producer and exporter of wheat in the world, 
Europeans turned to the United States, to the 
Great Plains, for their food supply. Wheat, it 
was said in Washington and in the western 
provinces, would help win the war by feeding 
the Allies and toughening their resolve. When 
the war ended, Europe for a while still needed 
food imports, and by 1919 America, under 
government-set goals, harvested 74 million 
acres of wheat-yielding 952 million bushels in 
all, a 38 percent increase over the 1909-13 
average, and providing 330 million bushels for 
shipment abroad. Most of this gain came in 
winter wheat, the standard variety grown over 
most of the southern Plains, which was 
planted in the fall and cut in the following 
midsummer. From 1914 to 1919 Kansas, 
Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas 
had expanded their wheatlands by 13.5 million 
acres, mainly by plowing up 11 million acres of 
native grass." 
The Great Plow-up, initially provoked by 
the wartime mobilization of the national 
economy, might have been expected to pass 
with victory. Such was not to be the case. The 
war integrated the plains farmers more thor-
oughly than ever before into the national 
economy-into its network of banks, railroads, 
mills, implement manufacturers, energy com-
panies-and, moreover, integrated them into 
an international market system. When the war 
was over, none of that integration loosened; 
on the contrary, plains farmers in the 1920s 
found themselves more enmeshed than ever, 
as they competed fiercely with each other to 
payoff their loans and keep intact what they 
had achieved. By the mid-twenties that inte-
gration did begin to payoff; having squeezed 
THE DIRTY THIRTIES III 
through the postwar depression, many plains 
farmers began to rake in substantial fortunes. 
There was, for instance, Ida Watkins, the 
"wheat queen" of Haskell County, Kansas, 
farming two thousand acres; in 1926, she made 
a profit on her wheat of $76,000, more than 
President Coolidge's salary. Down in the 
Texas panhandle the movie mogul Hickman 
Price set about to show plainsmen what 
modern commercial farming could really do, 
how it could apply the large-scale business 
methods of Henry Ford to the mass produc-
tion of wheat. His factory farm stretched over 
fifty-four square miles and required twenty-five 
combines at harvest time. In every part of the 
Plains there were pacesetters like this man and 
woman who fervently believed in capitalistic 
enterprise and sought to apply it to the 
unproductive grasslands. These two were 
among the largest and most successful entre-
preneurs; the less aggressive were forced by the 
competitive marketplace to follow their lead.13 
The mobility of Malin's machines not only 
allowed these large-scale enterprises to develop 
but also encouraged widely dispersed holdings. 
It was now possible to drive one's equipment 
to another county or even to another state, 
plant wheat, return home in a few weeks, and 
wait until the next spring before visiting the 
land again-in other words, to become a 
"suitcase farmer." This was particularly attrac-
tive to wheat speculators, many of whom were 
city bankers, druggists, or teachers; they put in 
their seed, went back to their regular work, 
and waited to see what would happen to the 
Chicago grain futures. In a year of high prices 
they might make a killing, paying for an entire 
farm with one crop, then selling the land at a 
tidy sum to another fast-buck chaser. Not all 
suitcase farmers were looking for such quick 
returns; some of them were more concerned 
about their investment's long-range security." 
But the machine made possible, as it made 
common, an exploitative relationship with the 
earth-a bond predominately commercial-so 
that the land became little more than a form of 
capital that must be made to pay as much as 
possible. 
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All across the flat open spaces the tractors 
steadily plowed away, especially in the second 
half of the twenties and up until the very eve of 
the dust storms. Occasionally they even 
worked at night, their headlights moving like 
fireflies in the grass. Near Perryton, Texas, 
H. B. Urban, an altogether typical wheat 
farmer of the day, arrived in 1929 and cranked 
up his two International tractors; each day he 
and his hired man broke out twenty acres of 
native prairie, until virtually his whole section 
of land was stripped of its grama and buffalo 
grass. In thirteen southwestern Kansas coun-
ties, where there had been two million crop 
acres in 1925, there were three million in 1930. 
Altogether in that period farmers tore up the 
vegetation on 5,260,000 acres in the southern 
Plains-an area nearly seven times as large as 
Rhode Island. Most of the freshly plowed 
ground went into wheat, so that over the 
decade of the twenties the production of that 
cereal jumped three hundred percent, creating 
a severe glut by 1931. That, in sum, was the 
environmental history immediately preceding 
the dirty thirties. When the black blizzards 
began to roll across the region in 1935, one-
third of the Dust Bowl region-thirty-three 
million acres-lay naked, ungrassed, and vul-
nerable to the winds. 15 
This Great Plow-up was not dictated by 
Malthusian population pressures, which in 
many parts of the world have been responsible 
for decisions to put marginal land into food 
productior. Nor was it exclusively or primarily 
drought that disrupted the ecological system of 
the Plains; it was humans and the economic 
culture pushing them ahead. Nor was their 
push carried out in ignorance or inexperience. 
For over a century men had been coming into 
the shortgrass country, observing it, and 
writing about its risks. For a half-century 
before the Dust Bowl, cattlemen had trailed 
their animals to railheads there, and farmers 
had repeatedly tried breaking the sod to make 
houses and crops, leaving a record of devastat-
ing reverses as well as some years of bounty. 
Furthermore, by the second and third decades 
of the twentieth century the region could by 
no means be labeled an intellectual frontier; an 
extensive scientific literature was available on 
it, and the hard realities of the country had 
permeated widely into common conscious-
ness. 1" All of this information was almost 
studiously disregarded in the 1920s plow-up. 
To describe those who did that disregarding as 
backward, primitive folk, as a hard-living 
rabble of frontiersmen, simply will not do. On 
the contrary, they were, especially the leaders 
among them, people with access to capital and 
expertise; some of them were in fact men and 
women of education and broad sophistication. 
The historical problem to be solved is why 
such people used their capital as they did, why 
they demanded and quickly deployed the new 
machinery, why they chose to hear what they 
did from the past and present, shutting out 
what did not appeal to them-what, in other 
words, they were after and why. If we call them 
hungry, then we must be careful to specify 
what they were hungry for. If we call them 
pioneers, then we must go further to distin-
guish them from other pioneers in national 
and world history. 
Essentially, the Great Plow-up was the 
work of a generation of aggressive entrepre-
neurs, embued with the values and world view 
of American agricultural capitalism. They 
smelled an opportunity to create a profit on 
the Plains and, in the classic way of entrepre-
neurs, they charged out to create that profit-
to derive from the land both personal wealth 
and status. No matter that others had failed or 
that the risks were high; these entrepreneurs 
were convinced they would succeed, as indeed 
they did in the short run. For a few years at 
least they made the region say money instead 
of grass. Throughout the twenties a scattering 
of reporters came to watch them succeed, 
writing up their achievements in glowing prose 
for newspapers and magazines. Many of these 
farmers had once been lowly clodhoppers; now 
they were making their mark on the world, 
were getting celebrated as "kings" and 
"queens" of wheat. And justly so, for the food 
that poured from the erstwhile grasslands was, 
if the environmental costs are disregarded, a 
positive gain for the nation and the world as 
well as for the entrepreneurs. They heard little 
criticism. Standing behind them all the way, 
trumpeting their contribution to humanity 
repeatedly so that it was not lost on the 
American public or on the farmers, was a vast 
chorus of bankers, millers, railroad executives, 
and government officials, all of them looking 
forward themselves to sharing in the abun-
dance being created. It is, of course, the nature 
of entrepreneurs, in agriculture as in industry, 
to disregard the voices of caution and crit-
icism, to show themselves venturesome where 
others have been ruined, and to court disaster. 
Entrepreneurialism was not a new cultural 
innovation on the Plains. It had been around, 
gathering force, seeking territory for its ex-
pression, for several centuries-indeed it had 
been the animating ethos of the economic 
culture of capitalism since its rise to hegemo-
ny.17 Out of that imported cultural heritage we 
can single out several influential ideas about 
nature and farming, all of them endlessly 
reiterated and repeatedly acted on by Euro-
peans and Americans long before anyone had 
contemplated plowing the high Plains. Each of 
these would be an idea with bleak conse-
quences in the 1930s. 
First, the agricultural entrepreneur stood 
for the idea that the land's true and only end 
was to become a commodity-something to be 
used, bought and sold, for human gain. The 
land itself, divided into property and made an 
object of speculation, was the first part of 
nature to be commodified by this culture, then 
came its products. That drive toward commod-
ification was never uncontested or universally 
accepted. On the Plains there were, as there 
had been elsewhere, many rival cultural values 
present; often these had been brought over 
from Old World farming or religious tradi-
tions, or from some obscurely intertwined, 
peasant-grounded combination of the two. IS 
These rivals for moral authority found their 
way into much of the literature and art of the 
region; into, for example, the novels of Willa 
Cather, who spoke often of the mysterious 
spiritual power of the Plains-of an indwelling 
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presence in nature there, one particularly 
accessible to many women and to recent 
immigrants. 19 But it is safe to say that the 
typical wheat entrepreneur did not read Cath-
er or put much stock in peasant modes of 
thought. None of that, he was quick to insist, 
was rationally compatible with his drive to 
dominate and commodify. 
Second, entrepreneurialism was part and 
parcel of the social ideal of economic individu-
alism. It deliberately made, with no end of 
paradox, the pursuit of private wealth into a 
social ethic. The implications in that individu-
alism for the ecological communities of the 
Plains were predictable: farmers would not be 
expected to accommodate their ambitions to 
the whole of nature, or recognize and use those 
ecological interdependencies for their own 
survival. Likewise, they would, and did, reject 
any restraint on their economic freedom to get 
what they could from the Plains in their own 
terms now, in their own generation. All 
others, future and pre~ent, must look out for 
themselves. Here again Malin was simply 
wrong; it was the entrepreneurial culture, not 
frontier life, that was destructive to communal 
bondedness and social stability.20 
Third, risk was treated in this economic 
culture almost as a positive value, as a needed 
spur to success. Without risk, there could be 
no gain. This idea has been emphasized earlier; 
what should be added now is the insistent 
search by the bearers of entrepreneurial cul-
ture to find ways to pass the risks on to 
someone else. Since they saw themselves as 
taking chances that, if profitable, would enrich 
the entire society, entrepreneurs hoped that 
others would pay some of their costs. In the 
case of the Dust Bowl those costs included the 
damage that the dust storms did to health and 
property and the rehabilitation they neces-
sitated. More than $2 billion was spent by New 
Deal agencies in the thirties to keep the 
farmers of the plains region in business. 21 As 
risk-spreaders, these federal programs signified 
the maturation of the national capitalist 
economy: the coming of a new era when 
entrepreneurial drives need not entail such 
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severe penalties for failure. Back in the 1890s, 
when little outside assistance had existed, the 
plains settler had learned that he had either to 
adapt to nature or leave. The generation that 
came to plow in the twenties and ate their own 
dust in the thirties successfully evaded much of 
that disciplining. They lived in a more humane 
and protective age that allowed them consider-
able economic freedom while removing some 
of the old anxiety and the bitterness of defeat. 
Bring these ideas, this economic culture, 
into a volatile environment where intermittent 
drought was a fact of life-and the outcome 
could hardly be anything different from the 
dirty thirties. That such an outcome would 
seem to be unavoidable is clear in the famous 
government report, The Future of the Great 
Plains (1936). Its chief author, the economist 
Lewis Cecil Gray of the Resettlement Admin-
istration, one of the country's leading agricul-
tural historians, made an analysis of the 
cultural roots of the Dust Bowl similar to the 
one suggested here, of "the attitudes of mind" 
inherent in an expansionary, entrepreneurial 
society.22 The evidence was clear to Gray that 
the disaster could not be wholly laid at the 
door of nature, of imperfect technique, of 
inadequate knowledge, or of "frontier society." 
As in the case of that other great tragedy of the 
decade, the Depression, the Dust Bowl was a 
crisis made and delivered by socially destruc-
tive forces in modern American culture. 
In 1946 James Malin vigorously rejected 
Gray's cultural analysis of the plains debacle, 
and he was not alone. His was a common 
response in the region, somewhat so in the 
thirties and unabashedly so by the time he 
wrote. A resurgent national economy, a new 
war raging in Europe, the success of the federal 
relief programs in helping people hang on until 
better times-all these elements made deeper 
critical inquiry unpopular. Most important of 
all, nature contributed to the renewal of self-
assurance. The return of rains, accompanied 
by bumper wheat crops in the early 1940s, 
demonstrated that the environmental damage 
had not been permanent-and, indeed, it has 
been difficult until the present nuclear age for 
humans anywhere to inflict irreversible de-
struction on the earth and its fabric of life. 
Nature has extraordinary powers of recupera-
tion, a fact that has been proved many, many 
times in the long geological history of the 
Great Plains. When the healing comes, it is 
easy and altogether human to suppress the 
memory of misjudgment and loss; to revert to 
old, familiar ways and deny responsibility. 
That was precisely what Malin hoped would 
happen: a renewal of faith in the culture of 
entrepreneurial farming. Any effort to find a 
different path for the Plains he harshly identi-
fied with "totalitarianism."" 
Despite assurances that the Plains would 
achieve a mature agricultural capitalism in the 
post-World War II period; that the land and 
society would come under firm, enlightened 
control; that no radical reform in the culture 
would be necessary, the region's recent ecologi-
cal history has seen some disturbing chapters. 
. High crop prices and great profit expectations 
have again and again produced waves of profit-
seeking enterprise when grasslands have been 
destroyed to make more crops. In the af-
termath of each of those waves have come new 
cycles of dust storms, some of them as grueling 
as anything in the thirties. Then, so the 
familiar pattern goes, the blowing dust brings 
in its train warnings from federal soil scientists, 
larger budget requests from federal agencies, 
and talk of new state and national laws to 
reform the culture. Perhaps these frequent 
replays of the thirties have produced a cumula-
tive reform of the culture. One might argue, 
though not precisely in the terms Malin did, 
that the capitalistic agriculture has in fact been 
substantially altered since the 1930s; that it no 
longer enjoys the power and influence it once 
held in the region; that today it is strictly 
hedged about with governmental authority; 
and that these reforms, these countervailing 
pressures, have successfully prevented another 
Dust Bowl from occurring." It will take a few 
serious, prolonged droughts to test thoroughly 
the accuracy of such an argument. Very recent 
evidence, however, indicates that the entrepre-
neur is still around, still sitting tall in the 
tractor seat--and the old danger is not over. 
In the late spring and early summer of 1983 
the national news again announced the im-
pending threat of western wind erosion. For 
example, Time reported that wheat operators 
had torn up the sod on 6.4 million acres of 
marginal grasslands in Montana and Colora-
do. Depressed livestock prices and favorable 
federal wheat support programs were responsi-
ble for this frenzy. "I want to make a buck," 
was the way one Montanan expressed his 
motives to Time. He and his neighbors had 
broken 250,000 acres of grazing land over the 
preceding decade. "We face the possibility of 
another Dust Bowl," said the executive vice 
president of the Montana association of con-
servation districts. So serious was the threat 
that the conservative senator from Colorado, 
William Armstrong, with backing from the 
Reagan administration and the Montana 
Stockgrowers Association, introduced a "sod-
buster" bill that would deny federal payments 
of any kind for crops grown on highly erodible 
land. And a Colorado county began contem-
plating the issuing of permits by its commis-
sioners before any more sod could be plowed 
up." Unmistakably, leaders of the region were 
being forced to admit that they did not yet 
have sufficient public authority to restrain 
risk-taking entrepreneurs, nor could they 
depend on capitalistic maturity to achieve soil 
conservation. Whether they now had the will 
to establish that authority remained to be 
decided. 
The ecological history of the future Great 
Plains is still to be accomplished, still to find its 
historians. When they come to write it, they 
will have a subject of international signifi-
cance, for these days the dry lands of the earth 
are everywhere under pressure and scrutiny. In 
that future history, as in past accounts, we 
may expect the key issue to be the fit of the 
Plains's economic culture to its environment. 
And we can predict that historians will return 
often to the dirty thirties to understand what 
that culture has been and what it is in the 
process of becoming. 
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